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Reliabilism: A Response to the Gettier Problem 
 
Jennifer Geffner ‘09 
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Edmund Gettier, author of  Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, poses a problem to the 
contemporary epistemologist: he objects that knowledge is not justified true belief.  His 
problem has left philosophers either to develop further criteria for knowledge or to 
defend the traditional definition of knowledge—justified true belief. 
 
Alvin Goldman, author of What 
is Justified Belief?, responds to a certain 
type of Gettier case by providing a new 
account of justification. While 
Goldman’s efforts are laudable, I argue 
that his theory of justification fails to 
answer the problem raised by Gettier.  
Gettier reveals that justified, true 
belief is not sufficient for knowledge. 
Even though a belief may be justified 
and true, Gettier seems to worry that the 
truth or justification of the agent’s belief 
may be a matter of luck. For example, 
suppose that an agent is driving a Ford 
through a town filled with barn-like 
structures. The agent stops the car in 
front of what appears to be a barn and 
forms the belief that there is a barn in the 
town. This belief seems justified because 
it was caused by the agent’s perception. 
The town that the agent is in, however, is 
actually one filled with barn facades. 
Ironically, the agent’s belief is true 
because the agent stopped in front of the 
only real, three-dimensional barn in the 
town when he formed his belief. 
Because the agent holds a true, justified 
belief, the agent seems to know that 
there is a barn in the town. Gettier, 
however, argues that the agent’s true, 
justified belief is not knowledge because 
it is coincidental that his belief is 
justified and true.1 Since the truth of the 
agent’s belief may be disconnected from 
its justification, Gettier claims that 
knowledge requires something more. 
Goldman tries to solve one of the 
problems posed by Gettier through 
reliabilism: the theory that an agent’s 
belief is justified if it was caused by a 
cognitive process that tends to produce 
true beliefs.2 For example, perception 
generally produces true beliefs and thus 
is a reliable mechanism that can justify 
an agent’s belief. Reliabilism is an 
externalist theory of justification because 
the facts about a process’s reliability are 
not available to the agent’s immediate 
consciousness. Consequently, for a 
belief to be justified, Goldman claims 
that the agent need not know the 
reliability of the process that caused his 
belief.3 Rather, Goldman claims that a 
belief is sufficiently justified if it was 
caused by a reliable process. Because 
justification is a result of a process that 
produces beliefs that tend to be true, 
                                                
1 Edmund, Gettier. Is Justified True Belief 
Knowledge?. In Contemporary Debates in 
Epistemology, ed. Matthias Setup and Ernest 
Sosa, (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 126 
2 Alvin, Goldman. What is Justified Belief. In 
Reading Epistemology, ed. Sven Bernecker, 
(Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 33 
3 Goldman, 32 
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Goldman seems to claim that the 
justification of an agent’s true belief is 
not a result of luck. 
Critics object that reliabilism is 
not sufficient for justification. Reliable 
processes such as sensory experiences 
may lead an agent to draw a false 
conclusion. For example, suppose that 
an agent is unaware that he is driving 
through a town filled with fake barns. 
The agent stops before one of the barn 
facades and forms the belief that there is 
a barn before him. According to 
reliablism, the agent is justified in his 
belief because it was formed through a 
reliable mechanism, perception. Even 
though the agent’s belief was caused by 
a reliable mechanism, the agent’s belief 
is not true. Because an agent may draw 
false conclusions from a process that 
tends to produce true beliefs, it does not 
appear as though reliabilism sufficiently 
justifies one’s beliefs. 
 Goldman could deny that this 
counter-example does not reveal that 
reliabilism is insufficient for 
justification. Goldman might claim that 
the agent’s belief may be justified by a 
reliable mechanism, but false. 
Reliability, according to Goldman, is 
conditional; he writes, “Justifiedness 
seems to be a function of how a cognizer 
deals with his environmental input […] 
that registers and transforms the 
stimulation that reaches him.”4 If special 
circumstances obtain, then Goldman 
claims that reliable causal processes may 
generate false beliefs.5 For instance, in 
the prior example, the agent formed his 
belief through a reliable process, 
perception, but the barn facades rendered 
the agent’s inputs false. Because a 
function’s outputs are dependant on its 
inputs, the agent may generate a false 
                                                
4 Goldman, 36 
5 Goldman, 37 
belief if his inputs are limited. Even so, 
the process is still reliable because of 
how it transforms inputs into outputs.  
Or, Goldman might claim that 
the agent did not make full use of other 
available processes.6 If the agent had 
walked around the barn, for example, he 
would have discovered that the barn was 
a fake. It is unclear, however, whether 
Goldman is willing to make this claim. 
Goldman writes, “It seems implausible 
to say that all ‘available’ processes ought 
to be used, at least if we include such 
processes as gathering new evidence.”7 
If the agent were to make full use of 
other available process, then it seems 
that the agent would need to engage in a 
never-ending process to be justified. 
While Goldman might not want to 
embrace these implications, in making 
this claim or the latter, Goldman repairs 
his argument that reliabilism is sufficient 
for justification.  
 However, critics claim that the 
agent may lack knowledge even if the 
mechanism that caused the agent’s belief 
is operating under normal conditions and 
the agent’s belief is true. To elucidate 
critics’ objection, let us apply reliabilism 
to the initial Gettier case presented. 
Assuming the logic of reliabilism, the 
agent’s belief that there is a barn in the 
town seems justified because it was 
caused by reliable processes. Given that 
the agent’s belief is reliably justified and 
true, it seems that the agent knows that 
there is a barn in the town. However, 
even with reliabilism, the connection 
between the truth and justification of the 
agent’s belief is a result of luck. 
Consequently, reliabilism does not seem 
to provide an account of justification that 
can solve this type of Gettier case. 
                                                
6 Goldman, 40 
7 ibid. 
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 Goldman could admit that 
reliabilism permits the agent has 
knowledge in these Gettier scenarios. In 
the prior example, Goldman might claim 
that the agent knows that there is a barn 
in the town because the agent’s belief is 
true and was caused by a reliable 
process. From the reliabilist’s 
perspective, it does not appear as though 
this knowledge is a result of luck. 
Rather, according to the reliabilist, the 
agent has knowledge because of the 
connection between the truth of the 
agent’s belief and the reasons the agent 
has for his belief. If Goldman were to 
claim that the agent does not have 
knowledge, then he cedes to the 
internalist who believes that justification 
is a result of what the agent can become 
aware of through reflection.8  
 Goldman’s intuition clashes with 
that of his critics. If the reliabilist claims 
that the agent has knowledge in this type 
of Gettier case, then critics would 
respond that reliabilism does not require 
the right causal connection between the 
agent’s belief and its justification. Had 
the agent stopped at any other barn, for 
example, the agent would not have been 
justified in his belief. Because 
reliabilism permits epistemic luck to 
account for knowledge, critics assert that 
there is still a disconnect between the 
truth and justification of an agent’s 
belief. Therefore, critics conclude that 
Goldman’s account of justification 
cannot solve this certain type of Gettier 
problem. 
 Even though a clash of intuitions 
has resulted, I conclude that Goldman’s 
account of justification fails to solve the 
problem posed by Gettier: he objects that 
true, justified belief is not sufficient for 
knowledge. Goldman provides a theory 
                                                
8 Sven Bernecker. Reading Epistemology. 
(Malden, Blackwell), 27 
of justification that causally links 
justification and truth because of its 
requisite for the agent’s belief to be 
caused by a process that is likely to 
produce true beliefs. Reliabilism offers 
an attractive account of justification 
because justification requires a causal 
link between justification and truth. 
Even so, Goldman’s account of 
justification does not seem to provide a 
link that is strong enough to evade the 
Gettier problem. In certain Gettier type 
cases, it is questionable whether the 
agent has knowledge because he is 
properly justified or if he holds 
knowledge by accident. I argue that the 
contemporary epistemologist must 
abstract from the uncertain and not 
award the agent knowledge if his 
knowledge may be a result of luck. 
Rather, the agent should only be 
awarded knowledge if it is certain that 
he is properly justified in holding a true 
belief. Because reliabilism does not 
provide a strong causal link between 
truth and justification when it is applied 
to certain types of Gettier cases, I argue 
that reliabilism fails to answer the 
problem raised by Gettier.
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